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it also claimed these facts were corroborated by an inspection card prepared by another 
person? Whether the affidavit set forth admissible evidence is a legal question reviewed for 
correctness.3 This issue was raised below in response to defendants' motion to strike the 
affidavit.4 
2. Was summary judgment precluded by material factual disputes concerning 
when installation of a pellet stove flue system was completed? "An appellate court reviews 
a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for 
correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party."5 This issue was raised below in response to 
defendants' motion for summary judgment.6 
3. Is a pellet stove similar to a "building, structure, infrastructure, road, [or] 
utility" and thus an "improvement" as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(l)(d)? An 
appellate court reviews "the district court's interpretation and application of a statute for 
correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusion."7 This issue was 
raised in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment.8 
4. Is an improvement completed or possessed for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-21.5 prior to the time the homeowner can make use of the improvement? Review is 
3Dimick v. OHCLiquidiation Trust, 2007 UT App 73, \ 12, 157 P.3d 347, 350. 
4R. 215-228. 
5Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f^ 6 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
6R. 173-181. 
1
 Wasatch Crest Ins, Co, v, LWP Claims Adm'rs Corp,, 2007 UT 32, U 6, 158 P.3d 548, 
550. 
8R. 259-262. 
2 
for correctness.9 This was raised below in connection with the opposition to defendants' 
motion for summary judgment.10 
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking an affidavit filed after the 
initial response memorandum, where defendants had adequate opportunity to respond to the 
statements in the affidavit and no rule prohibited the filing of the affidavit? Review is for 
abuse of discretion.11 This issue was raised in the memorandum opposing the motion to 
strike the affidavit.12 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 (as enacted by 1999 Utah Laws 123) appears in the 
appendix. With amendments made by the 2008 Legislature, the section is now renumbered 
as Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-225. All citations and quotations to the statute in this brief are 
to the version of the statute in effect in 2002 when the claim arose. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a final order of dismissal entered 
on summary judgment. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plaintiff filed its complaint on 
December 16,2004.13 Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment14 on December 15, 
"Id. 
10R. 262-264; Transcript )R. 387) p. 45 11. 16-21. 
11Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993). 
,2R. 320-333. 
13R. 1-6. 
,4R. 136-138. 
3 
2006. The supporting memorandum15 contained citations to depositions, but the depositions 
were not attached to the supporting memorandum and do not appear in the record. Plaintiffs 
response,16 filed December 27, 2006, was supported by the Affidavit of Chad Edgington,17 
the Affidavit of Custodian of Records attaching the building inspection card for the 
property,18 and the Affidavit of Robert "Jake" Jackson, CFI.19 Defendants moved to strike 
portions of the Affidavit of Chad Edgington.20 
Oral arguments on the motions were held April 19,2007.21 The trial court interrupted 
the arguments and requested that both parties file memoranda on the issue of when the statute 
of repose began to run.22 Defendant filed a memorandum on that issue.23 Plaintiff filed a 
response memorandum24 supported by the affidavit of Dallas Monson. Plaintiff had referred 
l5R. 139-143. 
I6R. 173-181. 
17R. 147-165 (copy in Appendix C). 
18R. 165-169. 
19R. 170-172. 
20R. 184-185. 
21R. 240; Transcript at R. 387. 
22Transcript (R. 387) at pages 47-52. 
23R. 248-255. 
24R. 256-273. 
4 
to that affidavit at the oral arguments held April 19 and had given it to defendants a week 
prior to those oral arguments.25 Defendants moved to strike the Monson affidavit.26 
Continued oral arguments were held July 19,2007.27 The trial court ruled in favor of 
defendants, and a formal Order was entered September 10, 2007.28 Plaintiff filed its notice 
of appeal on September 28, 2007.29 
C. Statement of Facts. 
This statement of facts presents a general overview. This appeal asserts the facts were 
disputed, so those facts are discussed in more detail in the argument section of this brief. 
The home of Chad and Ann Edgington was consumed by a fire which first ignited 
December 19, and rekindled on December 20,2002.30 The home was extensively damaged, 
resulting in an insurance payment to Edgingtons of at least $626,792.67.31 Investigators 
determined the fire was caused by insufficient clearance between a pellet stove flue pipe and 
the nearby wood framing members.32 
25Transcript (R. 387) at page 38. 
26R. 292-293. 
27R. 342; Transcript (R. 387, pp. 53-120. 
28R. 345-357. 
29R. 377-378. 
30R. 148. 
3lR.4]j22. 
32R. Ill: see also R. 118. 
This case was commenced December 16, 2004.33 As explained in the argument 
below, the statute of repose in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(4) bars any action filed more 
than 12 years after "completion of the improvement." The critical issue, therefore, was 
whether "completion of the improvement" occurred before December 16,1990, as contended 
by the defendants, or after December 16, 1990 as contended by plaintiff. 
The home was constructed beginning in September or October 1990.34 Chad 
Edgington acted as the general contractor for the construction and was involved in all aspects 
of the construction.35 Construction was completed and the Edgingtons moved into the home 
in April 1991.36 Defendants placed the pellet stove in the home in mid-November 1990.37 
Defendants asserted they installed the venting (flue) within a day or two after placing the 
stove.38 
Plaintiff filed the Affidavit of Chad Edgington to establish that the flue pipe and duct 
work were not completed until early 1991.39 Mr. Edgington testified, "I have an independent 
33R. 1-6. 
34R. 150 Ij 6. The Affidavit of Chad Edgington states in paragraph 5 that construction 
commenced in September 1990. (R. 149.) That paragraph of the affidavit was stricken (R. 
348), but the commencement of construction date is also indicated in paragraph 6, which was 
not stricken. 
35R. 148 TJ 2; see also R. 236, excerpt of deposition of Chad Edgington, at page 6 lines 17-
19. 
36R. 151 |^ 11. 
37R. 139-140 TJ1. The statements of fact in the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment are supported by citation to depositions, but no depositions 
appear in the record. 
38R. 140 If 3. 
39R. 147-164. 
6 
recollection of the pellet stove and flue not being completed until the latter stages of the 
construction of my home."40 and "Mr. Nebeker did not complete his work on the pellet stove 
and flue until the latter part of the construction of my Fruit Heights home, which was in early 
1991."41 The trial court struck these and other critical portions of the affidavit42 and 
concluded there remained no factual dispute as to the installation date of the flue.43 The court 
held "completion of the improvement" in the statute of repose referred to installation of the 
stove rather than completion of the home,44 and ruled plaintiffs complaint was barred by the 
statute of repose in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 because it was not filed more than 12 years 
after completion of the improvements.45 Plaintiff thereafter perfected this appeal.46 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case concerns whether a claim is barred by the 12 year builders statute of repose. 
An improperly installed pellet stove flue caused a fire which destroyed the Edgington home 
in December 2002. Plaintiff commenced this action nearly two years later on December 16, 
2004. The statute of repose would bar this action if the "improvement" (as defined by statute) 
was completed prior to December 16,1990. Construction of Edgingtons' home commenced 
40R. 1511J10. 
41R. 1491J5. 
42R. 348-349. 
43R. 355-356^} 3. 
44R. 353-354. 
45R. 3561J5. 
46R. 377-378. 
7 
in September or October 1990 and was completed in April 1991. Two issues were presented 
related to the commencement date of the statute of repose: whether the critical date was 
completion of the entire home or just the installation of the pellet stove flue system into the 
unfinished home, and if the latter, when the installation of the pellet stove flue system was 
completed. 
In response to defendants' motion for summary judgment on the statute of repose, 
plaintiff presented the affidavit of Chad Edgington, who had been the general contractor for 
the construction of the home and was involved in all aspects of the construction. He testified 
from personal knowledge that the pellet stove flue was not completed until early 1991. The 
trial court struck that affidavit because Mr. Edgington also referred to the building inspection 
card as corroborating his memory. The trial court held the affidavit was "based" on the card, 
but this ruling was an improper weighing of the evidence. The affidavit presented admissible 
evidence based on personal knowledge, and it was error to strike the affidavit. If the facts 
stated in the affidavit were established at trial, plaintiffs action would be timely. 
An independent reason why this action is timely relates to the definition of 
"improvement" in the statute of repose. The statute defines "improvement" as "any building, 
structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar man-made change, addition, 
modification, or alteration to real property."47 A pellet stove flue is not "similar" to a 
"building, structure, infrastructure, road, [or] utility." It was error for the trial court to hold 
that the statute of repose started to run for each component part independent of the 
completion date of the entire home. 
'Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(l)(d). 
8 
Cases from other jurisdictions teach that even if "improvement" refers to the 
component parts, the statute of repose should commence to run only from the completion of 
the entire subcontract of an individual subcontractor. Defendants' work on this house 
included more than just the pellet stove flue system, and their work was not completed until 
early 1991. This action is timely with respect to the completion of the defendants' entire 
subcontract on this house. 
ARGUMENT 
I: THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHAD EDGINGTON PRESENTED 
COMPETENT ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BASED ON 
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE; THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
STRIKING PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT. 
On a summary judgment motion, the purpose of affidavits is "only to determine 
whether a material issue of fact exists, not to determine whether one party's case is less 
persuasive than another's or is not likely to succeed on the trial of the merits."48 "[I]t only 
takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments of the other side of the 
controversy and create an issue of fact."49 Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
establishes three minimum requirements for affidavits supporting a summary judgment 
motion: (1) the affidavit "be made on personal knowledge," (2) set forth facts "admissible 
in evidence," and (3) "show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein." Doubts should be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Summary 
*
%Ron Shepherd Insurance, Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1994) (citation 
omitted). 
49Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). 
9 
judgment is permissible "only when the matter is clear; and in case of doubt, the doubt 
should be resolved in allowing the challenged party the opportunity of at least attempting to 
prove his right to recover."50 "If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of 
fact, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the [non-moving] party."51 
The trial court erred in striking the Affidavit of Chad Edgington and appears to have 
resolved doubts as to admissibility in favor of the movants. The court justified striking 
paragraph 5 of the affidavit as follows: 
Paragraph 5 is stricken because it is speculative, it lacks 
foundation that Mr. Edgington is competent to interpret it and 
lacks foundation to support the conclusions he draws about the 
markings on the card. State Farm, through Mr. Edgington, is 
attempting to interpret marks on the inspection card which 
marks were made by another individual approximately 14 or 15 
years earlier than the affidavit was submitted.52 
The court gave similar reasoning for striking other paragraphs of the affidavit.53 
Plaintiff established the authenticity of the inspection card for the home by the 
affidavit of the Fruit Heights city manager/recorder.54 Defendants did not object to the 
admissibility of the inspection card. Defendants argued, however, that because of the 
passage of time Mr. Edgington's affidavit was subject to "heightened scrutiny" and 
inadmissible because he was just interpreting the marks on the card.55 This argument ignores 
5Q
 Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). 
51
 Wilkinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 975 P.2d 464 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted, brackets by 
the court). 
52R. 348-349, % c. 
53R. 348-349. 
54R. 165-169. 
55R. 187. 
10 
the difference between building a case based solely on inference from the inspection card, 
and using it merely to corroborate the witness's independent recollection. While Mr. 
Edgington did draw some conclusions from the inspection card itself, it was only to 
corroborate, not establish, his independent recollection of the events, as shown below. 
The affidavit established foundation through personal knowledge. Mr. Edgington 
stated he "was involved in all aspects" of the home's construction.56 In paragraph 5 of the 
affidavit he gave his lay interpretation of the meaning of the inspection card, and then stated: 
"The Inspection Card confirms my memory that Mr. Nebeker did not complete his work on 
the pellet stove and flue until the latter part of the construction of my Fruit Heights home, 
which was in early 1991."57 The plain wording of the affidavit thus shows Mr. Edgington 
had a personal recollection, based on having been involved in all aspects of the construction, 
that the pellet stove and flue was not completed until early 1991. The inspection card only 
confirmed this memory; it did not establish or create the memory. 
This was reinforced in paragraph 10: "I am positive that Mr. Nebeker did not finish 
his work on the pellet stove and flue in the home until early 1991. In fact, I have an 
independent recollection of the pellet stove and flue not being completed until the latter 
stages of the construction of my home."58 In striking paragraph 10 the trial court asserted 
that Mr. Edgington "bases the statements in paragraph 10 entirely on Mr. Edgington's review 
of the Inspection Card."59 Where Mr. Edgington expressly stated he had an "independent" 
'R. 148 1| 2. 
rR. 149 H 5 (italics added). 
1 15 I f 10 (italics added). 
R. 3491 e. 
11 
recollection, and where paragraph 10 did not even reference the inspection card, the trial 
court's conclusion is just plain wrong. "In considering a motion for summary judgment, it 
is not appropriate for a court to weigh the evidence or assess credibility; the sole initial 
inquiry is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact."60 
Even if there were some conclusory statements in the affidavit, those statements did 
not prejudice defendants and did not justify striking the admissible statements.61 
This Court should hold the Affidavit of Chad Edgington presented admissible 
evidence based on his personal recollection of events he observed while involved in every 
aspect of his home's construction. The trial court's order striking the affidavit should be 
reversed. 
II: SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PRECLUDED BECAUSE THE 
MATERIAL FACTS WERE DISPUTED. 
Defendants had the burden of establishing their affirmative defense of the statute of 
repose.62 "A summary judgment movant must show both that there is no material issue of 
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."63 Summary judgment 
is appropriate only ""if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
60Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639-640 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
61
 See Broadwater v. Old^Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 533 (Utah 1993). 
62uBecause statutes of limitation and repose must be raised as affirmative defenses, 
[defendants] have the burden of proof on the issue of whether plaintiffs action was timely 
filed);' Christiansen v. UnionPac. R.R. Co., 2006UT App 180,^ 11, 136P.3d 1266, 1271, 
quoting Koch v. Shell Oil Co., 52 F.3d 878, 880 (10th Cir. 1995). AccordSeale v. Gowans, 
923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996) ("As with any affirmative defense, defendants have the 
burden of proving every element necessary to establish that the statute of limitations bars Ms. 
Seale's claim."). 
630rvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 12. 
12 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."64 The 
"facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" must be viewed "in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party."65 
The statements in the Affidavit of Chad Edgington clearly create issues of fact 
concerning when the pellet stove flue was completed. Point I of this brief establishes the trial 
court erred in striking portions of that affidavit. Even without those portions, however, the 
reasonable inferences from the facts precluded summary judgment. Defendants sought 
summary judgment based on invoices showing that the stove and the materials for the flue 
were purchased in November 1990. Some materials for "flue set" were invoiced on 11/10/90 
and paid 12-4-90.66 An additional charge for "Pellet Stove Materials flue" was made on 11-
26-90, with no indication of when or if it was paid.67 Paragraph 4 of the Edgington affidavit 
states there would have been additional invoices, including invoices for labor.68 Paragraph 
7 of the affidavit states some of the parts and supplies were paid prior to completion of the 
installation of the pellet stove and flue pipe.69 Paragraph 11 states Mr. Nebeker did not show 
how to use the stove until early 1991.70 A reasonable inference (and therefore a required 
64Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
650rvrs v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 1f 6. 
66R. 159. 
67R. 161. 
68R. 1481J4. 
69R. I501f7. 
70R. 151 H 11. 
13 
inference) from these facts is that the installation was not completed until early 1991, when, 
having just completed the installation, Mr. Nebeker then demonstrated the use of the stove 
as a finished installation. This inference was sufficient to create an issue of fact and preclude 
summary judgment. 
This Court should hold there was a genuine dispute as to when installation of the 
pellet stove flue system was completed. The summary judgment was inappropriate and 
should be reversed. 
Ill: A PELLET STOVE FLUE IS NOT AN IMPROVEMENT AS 
DEFINED IN THE BUILDERS STATUTE OF REPOSE. 
The trial court held that the pellet stove flue system was an "improvement" as defined 
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5, based on the language of section 78-12-21.5(l)(d).71 That 
subsection states: "'Improvement' means any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, 
or other similar man-made change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property." 
The determination of what constitutes the "improvement" is important because the statute 
of repose begins to run from the "completion of the improvement."72 Typically, the 
completion date for a component part will be earlier than the completion date for the overall 
project. 
This issue should be addressed by the Court even if the Court finds error in the order 
striking the Affidavit of Chad Edgington, because the issue may arise again on remand.73 It 
7lR. 352. 
72Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(l)(c). 
13See Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 U7 S5,<h 22, 100 P.3d 1200, 1205. 
14 
is essentially undisputed that the house was not completed until April 1991, so this action is 
timely if the statute of repose is calculated from completed of the entire house. 
When reviewing a statute, the court "looks first to the statute's plain language to 
determine the Legislature's intent and purpose. We read the plain language of the statute as 
a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and 
related chapters."74 The plain language of the statute here states that an "improvement" must 
be "similar" to "building, structure, infrastructure, road, [or] utility." A pellet stove flue is 
not similar to a building, structure, infrastructure, road, or utility, and therefore is not an 
"improvement." 
This construction is consistent with other related statutes. Any defect in the stove 
itself would be governed by the products liability statute of repose;75 it is unlikely the 
Legislature intended that claims related to the stove be governed by two separate statutes. 
As to claims related to the installation of the stove (such as the instant case), if the 
Legislature had intended that each discrete element of construction have its own 
commencement date, it could have easily so provided. For example, the South Carolina 
statute, in defining substantial completion of an improvement, expressly includes completion 
of "a specified area or portion thereof."76 California similarly states: "The date of substantial 
completion shall relate specifically to the performance . . . by each profession or trade 
14Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12,1 17, 66 P.3d 592, 597 (citations omitted). 
75Utah Code Ann. §§78-15-1 to -7. 
76S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-630 (1976), as quoted in Ocean Winds Corp. of Johns Island v. 
Lane, 556 S.E.2d 377, 378-79 (S.C. 2001). 
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rendering services to the improvement."77 The Utah statute, however, contemplates that 
"improvement" refers to the overall structure rather than each discrete subpart. 
Defendants supported their argument to the trial court by citation to several non-Utah 
cases holding that the date of completion under their particular statutes ran from the 
completion of a particular component, rather than completion of the entire project.78 
Analysis of those cases shows they do not support reading the Utah statute to define 
"improvement" as relating to each component part. In addition, an important fact in several 
of the cases was that the subcontractor for the component part had completed the entire 
subcontract. In the instant case, the pellet stove flue system was only a small part of 
defendants' subcontract.79 
Ocean Winds Corp. of Johns Island v. Lane,m cited by defendants, was based on 
statutory language that defines "substantial completion" as completion of a project "or a 
specified area or portion thereof."81 The case addressed whether the statute of repose for a 
window subcontractor ran from the completion of that subcontractors discrete part of a 
condominium proj ect. The case is obviously distinguishable because it was based on specific 
language in the statute. But, other language in the opinion actually supports plaintiffs 
77Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 337.15, as quoted in Industrial Risk Insurers v. Rust 
Engineering Co., 283 Cal. Rptr 873, 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
78R. 251-253. 
79R. 151 f 9, states Mr. Nebeker finishing the heating and air conditioning systems in early 
1991. This paragraph was stricken by the trial court; Point I of this brief challenges that 
ruling. There was no dispute, however, that Mr. Nebeker's work extended beyond installing 
the pellet stove flue. Transcript (R. 387) p. 25 11. 15-20, p. 73 1. 18 to p. 74 1. 9. 
80556S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 2001). 
8
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position. The court opined that the subcontractor "should have been able to assume with 
confidence that it would not be amenable to suit as of [the statutory period] after its windows 
were installed, and its portion of the project was substantially complete*1 
The statute at issue in Industrial RiskInsurers v. Rust Engineering Co.*3 similarly tied 
the completion date to the work "by each profession or trade rendering services to the 
improvement."84 
In Hopkins v. Fox*5 the court held the statute of repose ran from completion of the 
architects' design work, "their only service."86 The court distinguished a prior case87 as 
follows: 
In Welch, we used the date of project completion as the time 
when the statute begins to run even though "[t]he defect alleged 
. . . to have caused plaintiffs injury originated during the design 
stage." However, unlike the situation in the present case, the 
design and construction of the project in Welch were undertaken 
by the same entity. There, we refused to (< condone a piece-meal 
concept of repose where the contractor is involved in multiple 
phases of the undertaking." In this case we must decide whether 
the rule adopted in Welch applies to situations where the 
project's architect acted independently of the project's 
developer-contractor and where the architect furnished no 
services or supervision following the acceptance of his plans by 
that developer-contractor.88 
nId 
83283 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
*
4Id. at 874. 
85576 A.2d 921 (N.J. Super. 1990). 
86A/.at921. 
%1Welch v. Engineers, Inc., 495 A.2d 160 (N.J. Super. 1985). 
88576 A.2d at 923 (italics added). 
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Because defendants were involved in "multiple phases of the undertaking/' the analysis in 
Hopkins thus supports plaintiff, not defendants. 
Defendants also relied on Gordon v. Western Steel Co.89 The court there found that 
the statute of repose began to run from completion of each subcontractor's portion of the 
contract.90 In reaching that conclusion, however, the court distinguished situations where an 
entity is responsible for multiple aspects of the project: "When a single entity is responsible 
for the successive phases of a project, it would be unduly burdensome to segregate the 
completion of various successive projects by that entity, rather than focusing on when that 
entity finished its work towards the entire project."91 
A later Texas case confirmed this distinction. In Sanchez v. Mica Corp.92 the 
plaintiffs' decedent was killed when she walked over an electrical pull box in a sidewalk. 
The subcontractor sought refuge in the statute of repose, which had expired with reference 
to the completion of the work on the street where that particular pull box was located. The 
court rejected this effort: 
Based on the language in Gordon, the statute of repose with 
regard to project 1-A commenced when all of Mica's work on 
project 1 -A was completed, not simply a part of the work on that 
project. . . . It would be overly burdensome to decipher when 
individual portions of a subcontractor's overall project are 
completed for purposes of the statute of repose.93 
89950 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). 
90Id. at 749. 
9lId. at 747. 
92107 S.W.3d 13 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002). 
93Id. at 32. 
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In Fueston v. Burns and McDonnell Engineering Co.; also relied upon by 
defendants, the evidence showed the particular building and crane at issue had been folly 
completed, although the engineering company continued to consult regarding ongoing 
repairs, maintenance, and upgrades.95 
The cases cited by defendants in the trial court therefore support treating each 
component part separately where the governing statute so directs, or where the subcontractor 
has fully completed all work on that particular contract. Neither situation obtains here. 
Other cases confirm that "improvement" should be defined to include the entire 
project, not just an isolated component part. The court in Smith v. Showalter96 held that 
substantial completion occurs "when the entire improvement, not merely a component part, 
may be used for its intended purpose."97 Patraka v. Armco Steel Co.98 held: "The phrase 
'improvement to real property' generally refers to a structure or matter affixed to the realty 
and not each component part. . . ."" 
This Court should hold that "improvement" as used in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
21.5(1 )(d) refers to the entire structure, not to each component part. The trial court's holding 
to the contrary should be reversed. 
'877 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). 
'Id. at 634. 
734 P.2d 928 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). 
]Id. at 931 (italics by the court). 
?495 F. Supp. 1013 (M.D. Pa. 1980). 
"Id. at 1019. 
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IV: THE PELLET STOVE FLUE WAS NOT COMPLETED UNTIL 
IT WAS AVAILABLE FOR USE. 
If this Court holds that "improvement" under the building statute of repose refers to 
the entire structure, it follows that the statute of repose does not bar this action. It was 
undisputed that the home was not completed until April 1991, within the 12 year statute of 
repose.100 If the Court determines that "improvement" refers to component parts, however, 
the Court should still determine that "substantial completion" did not occur until Edgingtons 
moved into the home and were able to use the pellet stove flue system. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(l)(c) provides: 
"Completion of improvement" means the date of substantial 
completion of an improvement to real property as established by 
the earliest of: 
(i) a Certificate of Substantial Completion; 
(ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing 
agency; or 
(iii) the date of first use or possession of the 
improvement. 
The trial court focused on the last subsection, "the date of first use or possession of 
the improvement," holding that the Edgingtons "possessed" the pellet stove flue system when 
the installation was completed.101 
The Court should infer that the word "possession" means lawful possession and 
possession in a situation where the improvement is available for use. Such possession could 
not have occurred prior to issuance of a certificate of occupancy. Prior to issuance of a 
°R. 151 TI 11. 
lR. 354. 
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certificate of occupancy, it would have been unlawful for Edgingtons to live in the house and 
thus possess the stove as an owner and user. 
No Utah case has interpreted this particular provision of the statute. Cases from other 
jurisdictions confirm that possession must mean an effective possession with the ability to 
use the improvement. For example, in Agri-mark, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,102 the 
court considered a statute of repose which ran from "(1) the opening of the improvement to 
use; or (2) substantial completion of the improvement and the taking of possession for 
occupancy by the owner."103 The particular improvement, part of a milk dehydrating plant 
upgrade, was installed and put into use in 1992104 but additional modifications, repairs, 
testing, and validation continued through 1995. The court adopted 1995 as the date the 
statute commenced, reasoning as follows: 
The installation at issue . . . can only be deemed an 
"improvement" if it can be "used' for the upgraded service for 
which it was specifically designed. The upgrade, however, 
concededly failed in its purpose when first installed; it merely 
provided the same production capacity as the existing 
equipment. Thus, the mere fact that the equipment was turned 
on in December of 1992 is, in the end, immaterial. After all, 
Plaintiff had no choice but to use the equipment in order to stay 
in business. Simply put, there was no "improvement" which 
could be "used" in the sense meant by the statute. 
To conclude otherwise would unduly thwart the intent of 
the statute. As applied here, the statute could not have been 
intended to insulate Niro from exposure to claims related to an 
improvement when that improvement had not been completed, 
102214 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D. Ma. 2002). 
mId. at 39. 
,07</.at37. 
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let alone substantially completed, or placed into actual use until 
years later.105 
By similar logic, the pellet stove flue system here was not in the "possession" of the 
Edgingtons until it was available for their use. Although Chad Edgington was the general 
contractor on this particular project, the case is legally no different than a typical home 
construction where the owner purchases a lot and hires a contractor to build using money 
from a construction loan obtained by the owner. The owner is technically in possession of 
any materials placed on the lot, but cannot put them to beneficial use and thus does not 
possess them in any meaningful sense until the owner can occupy the home. 
The Court should hold that possession as used in the builders statute of repose means 
possession with the ability to use. That did not occur in this case until after the certificate 
of occupancy was issued in April 1991. 
V: BECAUSE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT PREJUDICED BY ANY 
DELAY IN FILING THE AFFIDAVIT OF DALLAS MONSON, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING THE AFFIDAVIT. 
Dallas Monson was the Fruit Heights building inspector at the time the house was 
constructed, and testified by affidavit that the pellet stove flue was not completed when he 
inspected the home on December 18, 1990.106 The trial court struck the affidavit as being 
untimely and also on the ground that the statements in the affidavit were not based on 
independent recollection. Neither ground has merit. 
"Id. at 41. 
'R. 270. 
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The Monson affidavit was served on defendants in April 2007, long before the final 
oral arguments were held in this case on July 19, 2007. Defendants could not claim they 
were in any way prejudiced by the fact that the affidavit was not included with plaintiffs 
initial response to the summary judgment motion. In the absence of prejudice, the trial court 
should have considered the affidavit.108 
In addition, no rule prohibited the filing of the affidavit. Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is determined based on the affidavits and other 
materials "on file." Rule 7(c)(1) prohibits the filing of additional memoranda beyond the 
initial memorandum, response, and reply, but nothing in the rule prohibits filing additional 
affidavits. Particularly where the defendants had ample time to respond to the affidavit, the 
trial court abused its discretion in striking the affidavit. 
The claim that the affidavit was not based on personal knowledge was error for the 
reasons stated in Point I of this brief. In paragraph 3 of the affidavit, Mr. Monson states he 
made various inspections of the home. In paragraph 4, he states he inspected the home on 
December 18,1990. It further states that "I did notice that the rough heating and the framing 
and ventilation was not finished on that date."109 As with the affidavit discussed in Point I, 
the fact that Mr. Monson also referred to the inspection card does not mean it was the sole 
basis for his testimony. The trial court's order striking the affidavit is based on an improper 
weighing of the evidence, which is not permissible on summary judgment. 
l07Transcript (R. 387) at page 38. 
mSee State v. One 1983 Pontiac (JoeArave), 111 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1986) ("If the 
delay causes no prejudice, the date of the hearing is not a factor that should influence its 
disposition."). 
109R. 270^f4. 
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This Court should reverse the trial court's order striking the Affidavit of Dallas 
Monson. The statements in the affidavit create an issue of fact as to when the house was 
completed, and make summary judgment improper. The grant of summary judgment should, 
therefore, also be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should hold the Affdiavit of Chad Edgington presented admissible evidence 
so there were disputes of material fact that precluded summary judgment. The Court should 
further hold that the statute of repose commenced to run from the date the entire 
improvement (the house) was completed. Alternatively, the Court should hold the statute 
commenced to run from the date Edgingtons were able to take meaningful possession of the 
improvement. 
The order of dismissal should be reversed and the case remanded for trial on the 
merits. t 
DATED this^lL day of March, 2008. 
WITT & ANDERSON 
Brett C. Anderson 
Attorney for Appellant State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Company by and through its insured, 
Chad Edgington and Ann Edgington 
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TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART II. ACTIONS, VENUE, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
ARTICLE 1. REAL PROPERTY 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 (2002) 
§ 78-12-21.5. Actions related to 
improvements in real property 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Abandonment" means that there has 
been no design or construction activity on the 
improvement for a continuous period of one 
year. 
(b) "Action" means any claim for 
judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for 
acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty 
arising out of or related to the design, 
construction, or installation of an 
improvement, whether based in tort, contract, 
warranty, strict liability, indemnity, 
contribution, or other source of law. 
(c) "Completion of improvement" 
means the date of substantial completion of 
an improvement to real property as 
established by the earliest of: 
(i) a Certificate of Substantial 
Completion; 
(ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued 
by a governing agency; or 
(iii) the date of first use or possession 
of the improvement. 
(d) "Improvement" means any building, 
structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other 
similar man-made change, addition, 
modification, or alteration to real property. 
(e) "Person" means an individual, 
corporation, limited liability company, 
partnership, joint venture, association, 
proprietorship, or any other legal or 
governmental entity. 
(f) "Provider" means any person 
contributing to, providing, or performing 
studies, plans, specifications, drawings, 
designs, value engineering, cost or quantity 
estimates, surveys, staking, construction, and 
the review, observation, administration, 
management, supervision, inspections, and 
tests of construction for or in relation to an 
improvement. 
(2) The Legislature finds that: 
(a) exposing a provider to suits and 
liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach 
of duty after the possibility of injury or 
damage has become highly remote and 
unexpectedly creates costs and hardships to 
the provider and the citizens of the state; 
(b) these costs and hardships include 
liability insurance costs, records storage costs, 
undue and unlimited liability risks during the 
life of both a provider and an improvement, 
and difficulties in defending against claims 
many years after completion of an 
improvement; 
(c) these costs and hardships constitute 
clear social and economic evils; 
(d) the possibility of injury and damage 
becomes highly remote and unexpected ten 
years following completion or abandonment; 
(e) except as provided in Subsection (7), 
it is in the best interests of the citizens of the 
state to impose the periods of limitation and 
repose provided in this chapter upon all 
causes of action by or against a provider 
arising out of or related to the design, 
construction, or installation of an 
improvement. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-21.5 
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(3) (a) An action by or against a provider 
based in contract or warranty shall be 
commenced within six years of the date of 
completion of the improvement or 
abandonment of construction. Where an 
express contract or warranty establishes a 
different period of limitations, the action shall 
be initiated within that limitations period. 
(b) All other actions by or against a 
provider shall be commenced within two 
years from the earlier of the date of discovery 
of a cause of action or the date upon which a 
cause of action should have been discovered 
through reasonable diligence. If the cause of 
action is discovered or discoverable before 
completion of the improvement or 
abandonment of construction, the two-year 
period begins to run upon completion or 
abandonment. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b), an 
action may not be commenced against a 
provider more than 12 years after completion 
of the improvement or abandonment of 
construction. In the event the cause of action 
is discovered or discoverable in the eleventh 
or twelfth year of the 12-year period, the 
injured person shall have two additional years 
from that date to commence an action. 
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to an 
action against a provider: 
(a) who has fraudulently concealed his 
act, error, omission, or breach of duty, or the 
injury, damage, or other loss caused by his 
act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or 
(b) for a willful or intentional act, error, 
omission, or breach of duty. 
(6) If a person otherwise entitled to bring 
an action did not commence the action within 
the periods prescribed by Subsections (3) and 
(4) solely because that person was a minor or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal 
guardian, that person shall have two years 
from the date the disability is removed to 
commence the action. 
(7) This section shall not apply to an 
action for the death of or bodily injury to an 
individual while engaged in the design, 
installation, or construction of an 
improvement. 
(8) The time limitation imposed by this 
section shall not apply to any action against 
any person in actual possession or control of 
the improvement as owner, tenant, or 
otherwise, at the time any defective or unsafe 
condition of the improvement proximately 
causes the injury for which the action is 
brought. 
(9) This section does not extend the 
period of limitation or repose otherwise 
prescribed by law or a valid and enforceable 
contract. 
(10) This section does not create or 
modify any claim or cause of action. 
(11) This section applies to all causes of 
action that accrue after May 3, 1998, 
notwithstanding that the improvement was 
completed or abandoned before May 3, 1999. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-12-25.5, enacted by 
L. 1991, ch. 290, § 1; 1997, ch. 149, § 1; 
renumbered by L. 1999, ch. 123, § 1. 
NOTES: 
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Laws 
1991, ch. 290, § 1 repeals former § 78-12-
25.5, as last amended by Laws 1988, ch. 61, § 
1, relating to the seven-year limitation on 
actions for injuries due to defective 
improvements to real property, effective April 
29, 1991, and enacts the present section. 
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1999 
amendment, effective May 3, 1999, 
renumbered this section, which formerly 
appeared as 78-12-25.5, and rewrote the 
section. 
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SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, by and through it's 
insured, Chad Edgington and 
Ann Edgington, 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
FORCED AIRE, L.C. dba NEBEKER 
HEATING & A/C. BOYD L. NEBEKER 
dba FORCED AIRE HEATING AND 
AIR CONDITIONING, and JOHN 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No. 040700640 
Judge Darwin C. Hansen 
) 
On December 14, 2006, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with an 
accompanying memoraiidum in support. On December 26,2006, Plaintiff fled Plaintiff State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Company's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Order 
VD19BI4S79 pages: 
A ^ 7 A A ^ H j r n p r p n AIRF I C.DBA N E B E K E 
sisirz. 
Judgment which included the Affidavit of Chad Edgington, an Inspection Card from Fruit Heights 
City, an invoice from Nebeker Heating & Air Conditioning dated 11/10/90, an invoice from Nebeker 
Heating & Air Conditioning dated 11/26/90, and an invoice from Nebeker Heating & Air 
Conditioning dated 12/9/96, an affidavit from the custodian of records from Fruit Heights City, and 
the Affidavit of Robert "Jake" Jacobsen, CFI. On January 4,2007, Plaintiff filed its Request for Oral 
Argument in which it requested oral argument and informed the Court that the matter was ripe for 
decision. On January 15,2007, Defendant filed the Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
On January 15,2007, Defendant filed Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit 
of Chad Edgington with an accompanying memorandum in support. On March 6,2007, Plaintiff filed 
Plaintiff State Farm Fire & Casualty Company's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Chad Edgington. On March 16,2007 Defendant filed the Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Chad 
Edgington. 
On April 19, 2007, the Court heard oral argument on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Chad Edgington. At oral argument, 
counsel for Defendant, Bruce Burt, and counsel for Plaintiff, Brett Anderson, presented oral 
argument. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court instructed counsel for both parties to conduct 
additional research on when the statute of repose begins to run in residential new construction 
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settings. 
On June 15,2007, the Court held a telephonic scheduling conference in which the Court set 
a briefing schedule to submit the supplemental memoranda requested in the April 19,2007, summary 
judgment hearing. On June 15,2007, Defendant filed Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum on 
When the Statute of Repose Begins to Run. On June 27,2007, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff State Farm Fire 
& Casualty Company's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum on 
When the Statute of Repose Begins to Run and attached the Affidavit of Dallas Monsen thereto. On 
July 5,2007 Defendant filed Defendant's Reply Memorandum on When the Statute of Repose Begins 
to Run. 
On July 6, 2007, Defendant filed the Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dallas Monson [sic] and 
the Statement of Undisputed Facts in Plaintiff State Farm Fire & Casualty Company's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum on When the Statute of Repose Begins to 
Run. On July 17,2007, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff State Farm Fire & Casualty Company's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dallas Monson [sic] and the Statement 
of Undisputed Facts in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Supplemental 
Memorandum on When the Statute of Response Begins to Run. On July 18,2007, Defendant filed 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dallas Monson 
[sic]. 
On July 16, 2007, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff State Farm Fire & Casualty Company's Motion to 
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Strike Portions of the Defendant's Reply Memorandum on When the Statute of Repose Begins to 
Run and Request for Oral Argument with an accompanying memorandum in support. On July 19, 
2007, Defendant filed Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
Portions of Defendant's Reply Memorandum, 
On July 19,2007, the Court heard oral argument on all motions. Having carefully considered 
the briefs of both parties, arguments of counsel, having been thoroughly briefed on the motions, and 
for good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters the following ORDER: 
ISSUE NO. 1: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF CHAD 
EDGINGTON'S AFFIDAVIT 
In opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff submitted the Affidavit 
of Chad Edgington. In response, the defense filed a motion to strike portions of that affidavit. The 
following are the Court's conclusions regarding the Affidavit of Chad Edgington: 
a. Paragraph 2 may create an issue of fact, but the Court concludes that it is not a 
material issue of fact, 
b. Paragraph 3 may create an issue of fact, but the Court concludes that it is not a 
material issue of fact. 
c. Paragraph 5 is stricken because it is specutative, it lacks foundation that Mr. 
Edgington is competent to interpret it and lacks foundation to support the conclusions 
he draws about the markings on the card. State Farm, through Mr. Edgington, is 
attempting to interpret marks on the inspection card which marks were made by 
Page 4 of 13 
another individual approximately 14 or 15 years earlier than the affidavit was 
submitted. 
d. Paragraph 9 is stricken because the conclusions lack foundation and it is speculative 
and there is nothing in these invoices to support the conclusion that the pellet stove 
was completed in 1991. State Farm, through Mr. Edgington, is attempting to 
interpret what Mr. Edgington believed was established on the Inspection Card without 
proper foundational support. 
e. Paragraph 10 is stricken because Plaintiff did not lay foundation to show that Mr. 
Edgington had first hand knowledge about the specific contents of the Inspection 
Card or that he was qualified to interpret the marks on that card and because the 
conclusions are speculative. State Farm, through Mr. Edgington, bases the statements 
in paragraph 10 entirely on Mr. Edgington's review of the Inspection Card. 
f. Paragraph 11 is not stricken. The Court concludes that this paragraph may create an 
issue of fact, but it is not a material issue of fact. 
g. Paragraph 12 is stricken because it is conclusory, and is based on other inadmissible 
paragraphs in Mr. Edgington's affidavit and is therefore not admissible. 
ISSUE NO. 2: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF DALLAS 
MONSEN 
On June 27, 2007 Plaintiff filed Plaintiff State Farm Fire & Casualty Company's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum on When the Statute of 
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Repose Begins to Run and attached the Affidavit of Dallas Monsen thereto. The Defense filed a 
motion to Strike Dallas Monsen's affidavit and the following are the Court's conclusions relative to 
the defense's motion: 
a. The Affidavit of Dallas Monsen is stricken in its entirety. 
b. The Affidavit of Dallas Monsen was not timely filed. The affidavit existed at the time 
the initial summary judgment memoranda were filed. Further, when the Court 
requested additional research and memoranda at the April 19,2007, hearing the Court 
did not authorize or request additional affidavits. The Court simply asked for 
memoranda addressing the starting date on the statute of repose. It was the Court's 
intention that Rule 7 or the URCP be followed meaning that the Defendant file a 
supplemental memoranda addressing this limited issue, that Plaintiff file an opposition, 
and that Defendant file a reply memorandum. When Plaintiff filed the Affidavit of 
Dallas Monsen, he went beyond the Court's order and submitted matters outside the 
summary judgment pleadings and went outside the parameters of Rule 7. For these 
reasons, the Affidavit of Dallas Monsen is stricken. 
c. As additional bases for striking the Affidavit of Dallas Monsen, independent of the 
timeliness issue, the Court makes the following conclusions regarding the Affidavit 
of Dallas Monsen: 
i. Paragraph 4 is stricken because it is not based on the affiant's independent 
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recollection. There is no statement in the Affidavit asserting that the affiant 
has independent personal knowledge or recollection of the matters contained 
in this paragraph. 
ii. The Court will not strike Paragraph 5. 
iii. Paragraphs 6,7,8,9 are stricken. The Court concludes that these paragraphs 
are based on speculation and lack foundation showing that they are based on 
the affiant's personal knowledge and independent recollection. 
ISSUE NO. 3: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF DEFENDANT'S 
REPLY MEMORANDUM 
On July 16,2007 Plaintiff filed Plaintiff State Farm Fire & Casualty Company's Motion to 
Strike Portions of the Defendant's Reply Memorandum on When the Statute of Repose Begins to 
Run and Request for Oral Argument with an accompanying memorandum in support. The following 
are the Court's conclusions regarding Plaintiffs motion to strike: 
a. Plaintiffs motion is denied. Plaintiff argued that the defense's argument in the Reply 
Memorandum on When the Statute of Repose Begins to Run violated Rule 7 of the 
URCP by going beyond the scope of the opposition memorandum filed by State Farm. 
The summary judgment motion was filed by the defense. After the defense received 
Plaintiff State Farm Fire & Casualty Company's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum on When the Statute of Repose Begins to 
Run, the defendant responded directly to the arguments raised in State Farm's 
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opposition memorandum. The defense raised, in the reply memorandum, alternative 
arguments to the positions asserted by State Farm in order to establish that the pellet 
stove fell within the specific language of the statute of repose. State Farm argued that 
the pellet stove was not an "improvement" because it was not a "building, structure, 
infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar man-made change, addition, modification, 
or alteration to real property." The defendant countered this argument by asserting 
that the stove could be considered a "utility" or "infrastructure" and therefore an 
"improvement" within the meaning of the statute of repose, 
b. The Court concludes that the defense's argument in its reply was simply a rejoinder 
to the position of the defense asserted in its primary memorandum and was a direct 
response to arguments raised by Plaintiffs opposition memorandum, 
ISSUE NO. 4: WHETHER THE PELLET STOVE IS AN "IMPROVEMENT" 
The court concludes that the determination whether the pellet stove is an "improvement" 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(2002) is a question of law. Based on the language of Section 
78-12-21.5(l)(d)(2002), the Court concludes that the pellet stove installed in the Edgington home, 
even though the home was under construction, was an "improvement" to real property. Therefore, 
the installation of the pellet stove including the installation of the applicable flue is and was an 
"improvement" to real property under the facts of this case. 
ISSUE NO 5: WHEN THE STATUTE OF REPOSE BEGINS TO RUN 
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The next issue is whether the Statute of Repose found in U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(2002) begins 
to run when the house is completed or, in the alternative, when the subcontractor's work on the pellet 
stove was complete. The Court concludes that this determination is a question of law. The Court 
concludes that this is a matter of first impression in Utah. The Court concludes that the cases cited 
by the defendant and the public policy applicable in those cases and the public policy articulated in 
Section 78-12-21.5(2) establish that the Statute of Repose begins to run when a subcontractor 
completes the work associated with the contract for which the subcontractor was retained. 
Therefore, in this case when the Defendant subcontractor completed the installation of the pellet stove 
and accompanying flue, that is when the Statute of Repose began to run. The Court further 
concludes that the specific language of Section 78-12-21.5(l)(c)(2002) supports this conclusion. 
Specifically, "Completion of improvement" is defined in Section 78-12-21.5( 1 )(c) and means the date 
of substantial completion of an improvement to real property as established by the earliest of: 
(i) The issuance of a certificate of substantial completion. This subsection is not applicable 
under the facts of this case because it is not the "earliest" event. 
(ii) The issuance of a certificate of occupancy issued by a governmental agency. There were 
allegations that a certificate of occupancy was issued. The Court takes judicial notice that a 
certificate of occupancy is only issued by a governmental agency or city when the house has 
been completed, when all inspections have been performed and the house meets the 
regulations and zoning ordinances of the community. 
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(iii) The date of first use or possession of the improvement. The Court's conclusion (i.e. that 
the Statute of Repose begins to run when the subcontractor completes its work) expressly 
implies that "possession" will be the "earliest" event based on the facts of this case. 
Furthermore, in context of this case, the builder of this home was his own contractor; 
therefore, the builder is and was the owner of the property. He is the one who negotiated 
with the defendant subcontractor. He is the one that was responsible to ensure that the 
subcontractors complied with the building code. He was the one responsible to ensure that 
the inspections from the local community occurred and that the house passed all applicable 
inspections. The Court concludes that Mr. Edgington "possessed" the subject pellet stove 
and flue at the time installation of the pellet stove and flue was completed by the defendant. 
ISSUE NO. 6: STATEMENT OF INCONTROVERTED FACTS 
Based on the foregoing conclusions, the Court concludes that the following facts are 
uncontroverted in the summary judgment record: 
1. Chad Edgington was the general contractor on the construction of his Fruit Heights 
home, and was involved in all aspects of its construction. 
2. Installation of a pellet stove on Chad Edgington's real property by Defendant was 
conducted and completed in Mid-November, 1990. 
3. The installation of the pellet stove took about 4 hours. 
4. Installation of the pellet stove consisted of placing the pellet stove, and coming back 
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after a day or two to do the venting. 
5. None of Defendant's service calls after installation involved the pellet stove. 
6. The fire that is the subject of the present lawsuit occurred on or about December 19, 
2002. 
7. More than 12 years separate Defendant's completion of the work and the fire which 
forms the basis of Plaintiffs present suit. 
8. Plaintiff commenced his action against Defendant by filing a complaint on or about 
December 16,2004. 
All other facts in the summary judgment pleadings have either been stricken or are immaterial 
to the issues on summary judgment 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the resolution of the issues noted above and based on the uncontroverted facts, the 
Court concludes as follows: 
1 • The pellet stove and flue are "improvements" to real property as defined in Section 
78-12-21.5(2002). 
2, That Chad Edgington, as general contractor and owner of the home had possession 
of the pellet stove and flue upon the completion of the installation of the same. 
3. The only admissible evidence, after the Motion to Strike Portions of Chad 
Edgington's Affidavit and the Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dallas Monsen are 
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granted, is that the pellet stove and flue were completely installed during the month 
of November, 1990 or at the very latest on the day of the invoice for which the charge 
was submitted to the owner of the property for the services provided by the defendant 
subcontractor. The date on the invoice was December 4, 1990, 
4. A fire occurred at the home more than twelve (12) years later. The fire occurred on 
December 19,2002. 
5. Plaintiff claims that the fire was due to improper installation of the flue to the subject 
pellet stove. The Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are barred by the statute of 
repose because the work on the subject pellet stove flue was completed more than 
twelve (12) years before the fire. 
6. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted in its entirety. 
7. The Defendant is awarded its costs because this is a complete summary judgment and 
terminates the litigation. The Defendant will submit an Affidavit of Costs as a 
separate pleading. 
8. All claims against Defendant are dismissed with prejudice and the Complaint is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED thia^day of , ^ ^ f e 4 g > , 2007. 
n s\ 
ia  f t O^ » 
• Honorable Darwin Hansen 
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Approved as to Form: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i this the^day of M/M/M 
was mailed, first Class Mail, posl 
I hereby certify that on    /p/Oj/^l 2007,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER tage prepaid to the following address: 
BRETT C. ANDERSON 
WITT, MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
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APPENDIX C 
Affidavit of Chad Edgington (R. 147-164) 
Brett C. Anderson, Bar No. 8134 
WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P. C 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
800 West State Street. Farmmgton, Utah 84025 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, by and through it's insured, 
Chad Edgington and Ann Edgington, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FORCED AIRE, L.C. dba NEBEKER 
HEATING & A/C, BOYD L. NEBEKER, 
dba FORCED AIRE HEATING AND AIR 
CONDITIONING, and JOHN DOES 1-10 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
CHAD EDGINGTON 
Case No. 040700640 
Judge: Darwin C. Hansen 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
I, Chad Edgington, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows: 
-1-
FILED 
DCC 2 7 2006 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
VD19384027 
040700640 FORCED AIRE L C.DBA NEBEKER HEA 
1. I am the owner of a home located at 25 South Country Lane in Fruit Heights, Utah, 
which was consumed by a fire which occurred on December 19, 2002, and rekindled on December 
20, 2002, which fire gives rise to this action. 
2. I was the general contractor on the construction of my Fruit Heights home, and I was 
involved in all aspects of its construction. 
3. Since my deposition on September 28,2005,1 have had the opportunity to review a 
copy of the Inspection Card which was filled out by the building inspectors of my home. This card 
was acquired by Boyd Nebeker or his attorney and used by him as part of Exhibit " 1 " which he 
attached to the deposition transcript of Ann Edgington in this case. 1 did not review the Inspection 
Card for at least 14 years prior to my September 28, 2005 deposition, I was not questioned about it 
at my September 28, 2005 deposition, and I did not recall its contents at my September 28, 2005 
deposition. 
4. Since my deposition on September 28,2005,1 have also had the opportunity to review 
the Building Permit Application which was also part of Exhibit " 1 " of the deposition transcript of 
Ann Edgington, as well as invoices of Boyd Nebeker which Mr. Nebeker attached to the deposition 
transcript of Ann Edgington as Exhibits "3," u4," u5," and "6." The invoices which I reviewed are 
not all of the invoices which Mr. Nebeker would have given me. I know that Mr. Nebeker also billed 
me for a chimney cap, two furnaces, an air conditioning unit, and other materials and labor. I did not 
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review the Building Permit Application or Mr. Nebeker's invoices (order dates November, 1990) 
for at least 14 years prior to my September 28,2005 deposition. 
5. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit" 1" and incorporating herein by this reference a copy 
of the aforementioned Inspection Card, which card I copied from Exhibit " 1 " of the transcript of the 
September 28, 2005 Ann Edgington deposition and which was used by the building inspectors as 
they inspected the ongoing construction of my Fruit Heights home. As can be seen from the 
Inspection Card, the actual construction of the home commenced in September, 1990. The footings 
of the home were inspected and approved on September 18th and 21s1 of 1990. The foundation 
reinforcing steel was approved on October 4,1990, the ground plumbing was approved on October 
11,1990, and the slab was approved on October 22,1990. Most notable, framing and ventilation 
was inspected on December 18,1990, but was not checked or signed off, and instead has the marking 
"N.C." I believe this marking stands for t(Not Complete." A second entry on December 18,1990 
under the heading of "rough heating" is also not checked or signed off, and clearly states "not 
finished." At the bottom of the inspection card is a note which states "If work is not marked 
approved, make corrections noted under remarks and call for another inspection before continuing 
work." I did not secure an inspection of the completed framing, ventilation, or rough heating until 
early 1991. This would include the pellet stove and flue which were installed by Boyd Nebeker. The 
Inspection Card confirms my memory that Mr. Nebeker did not complete his work on the pellet stove 
and flue until the latter part of the construction of my Fruit Heights home, which was in early 1991. 
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6. In addition to the Inspection Card, I believe that the Building Permit Application 
accurately reflects the time line of the construction of my Fruit Heights home. Attached hereto as 
Exhibit "2" and incorporated herein by this reference is the Building Permit Application (again, the 
application was acquired by Boyd Nebeker or his attorney and used by him as part of Boyd 
Nebeker's Exhibit " 1 " to the Ann Edgington deposition). As can be seen on the Building Permit 
Application, I applied for the building permit on September 16,1990, and the permit was issued on 
October 15,1990. 
7. After reviewing the above described billing invoices of Mr. Nebeker, it is clear that 
I was initially charged only for parts and/or supplies purchased by Mr. Nebeker for the installation 
of the heating system in my home. Some of those parts and supplies were paid for before the 
completion of the installation of the pellet stove and flue pipe which were on the main level of my 
Fruit Heights home. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit "3V and incorporated herein by this reference are copies 
of invoices from Mr. Nebeker dated November 10,1990 and November 26,1990. On the November 
10, 1990 invoice are a number of entries for parts which I believe were for the installation of the 
pellet stove which was installed on the main floor of my Fruit Heights home by Mr. Nebeker. On 
the November 26,1990 invoice, Mr. Nebeker bills for "Pellet stove materials flue," as well as the 
whirlpool tub that he installed for me. 
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9. The above-referenced invoices were primarily for parts and materials only. Mr. 
Nebeker did not bill me for his labor until sometime after he finished installing the pellet stove, flue, 
and heating and air conditioning systems in early 1991. Attached hereto as Exhibit "4" and 
incorporated herein by this reference is an invoice wherein Mr. Nebeker bills me for labor and 
materials which he provided for the basement fireplace, flue pipe and duct work for my Fruit Heights 
home in 1996. 
10. I am positive that Mr. Nebeker did not finish his work on the pellet stove and flue in 
the home until early 1991. In fact, I have an independent recollection of the pellet stove and flue not 
being completed until the latter stages of the construction of my home. The Building Permit was 
issued on October 15, 1990, at which time only the foundation and ground plumbing had been 
approved by the inspector. The framing and rough heating were not complete on December 18,1990 
for the inspector, and they were not complete until early 1991. The framing and rough heating would 
need to be completed and passed off by the inspector long before I considered the home to be near 
the latter stages of construction. 
11. Construction on the home was finalized, and my family and I moved into the home 
in April of 1991. Prior to this, Mr. Nebeker personally demonstrated to me how to use the pellet 
stove. This was done well after the framing, windows and doors were completed and rough heating 
passed off by the inspector, and would have been in early 1991. Mr. Nebeker's work was not 
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completed and I had not accepted it as finished until he showed me how to use the pellet stove prior 
to my family and I moving into the home in April, 1991. 
12. For the reasons set forth above, the pellet stove was not installed prior to December 
20,1990, and Mr. Nebeker's work on the pellet stove and flue (as well as the rest of the heating and 
air conditioning work) was not completed by him until early 1991. 
Chad Edgington (Affiant), being first duly sworn and under oath, deposes and says that 
Affiant is the Petitioner in the above-entitled action; that Affiant has read the foregoing Affidavit, 
and understands the contents thereof, and the same is true of Affiant's own knowledge, information 
and belief. 
Chad Ei 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
X&-
2CL day of December, 2006. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
LAURIE CRIDDLE 
33 South Main St 
KaysvUle, Utah 84037 
My Commission Expires 
January 24, 2009 « 
STATE OF UTAH | 
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1110 West 500 South 
West Bountiful, Utah 84087 
(801) 299-1212 • Pager 488-6676 
/30B PHONE DATE OF ORDER 
\\->6-10 
JOB NAME / LOCATION 
CW'5> R**£f*r 
TO: 
^Q-y/s^/le 
PHONE 
ORDER TAKEN BY 
IBBM 
frwd /t/. 
^S^^^D^^^l^^S^ 
1 / 1 
rVf^ <T0Y> u A m ^ l ^ u L j 
We-4- CAm/p Aa-kruiU -PIUP 
I —. ^ 
r^\^:^"3 
\ } ^ - - ^ ^ " 
j LABOR 
1^ p 
HOURI RATE : AMOUNT 
WORK ORDERED BY 1 OATE COMPLETEO 
[ SIGNATURE (1 h«rot>y acknowt«d9« tho urtalcctory coopMion o» trw a*>ov« coffcftftd wofk.) 
TOTAL MATERIAL 
TOTAL LABOR 
TAX 
nifianH^you! 
PAY THIS AMOUNT v 
<5»\ 
Ptffl 
t-J 
\HW 
0 
\ll$0 
i~6'\ 
60 
\°°\ 
j_d 
Heating & Air Conditioning 
Sales and Service 
IB 10 West 500 South 
West Bountiful, Utah 84087 
(801)299-1212 
TO; 
C W p e^<^V^\fc L/\^  
JOB PHONE DATE OF ORDER 
JOB NAME/LOCATION 
Q ^ C Q C A ^ D ^ V fesv 
PHONE 
^^•\ XWvA s^ 
ORDER TAKEN BY 
TERMS: 
MlW^fflfiBS^^^^^^^w^^'JjS saK3 [pyyii jMt4 JjliTP 
V- -^e_pWi i_ l^AroV^WJS 
V \ W fct©^ . < ^ <^M< | 
•v v*\»-e- * 
^ ^ e ^ ~\*X c ^ C A ^ W ^ ^ 
*M£cTx t»l25 
LABOR HOUR RATE 
WORK ORDERED BY 
AMOUNT 
DATE COMPLETED 
1 SIGNATURE (1 hereby acknowledge the utWactory coropleUon of the above completed work.) 
TOTAL MATERIAL 
TOTAL LABOR 
TAX 
rjfcanfc QJouf
 / 
| PAY THIS AMOUNT BS* 
fff^tiSnd^^-^^ 
Qloo 
/3? 
%M1 
B / \ 
U 
This certifies that on this 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
day of December, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 'A 
foregoing Affidavit of Chad Edgington was mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
John M. Chipman 
Nelson, Chipman, Quigley & Payne 
215 South State Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APPENDIX D 
Affidavit of Dallas Monson (R. 268-272) 
Brett C. Anderson, Bar No. 8134 
WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P. C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
800 West State Street, Farmington, Utah 84025 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, by and through it's insured, 
Chad Edgington and Ann Edgington, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FORCED AD2E, L.C. dba NEBEKER 
HEATING & A/C, BOYD L. NEBEKER, 
dba FORCED AIRE HEATING AND AIR 
CONDITIONING, and JOHN DOES 1-10 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DALLAS C. MONSEN 
Case No. 040700640 
Judge: Darwin C. Hansen 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
I, Dallas C. Monsen, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am a Certified Building Inspector with the State of Utah, and have been since 1987. 
I am currently employed by the Summit County Building Inspector's Office inspecting new 
construction homes in Summit County, Utah. 
-1-
2. Between the years 1987 and 1994, I worked as the Building Inspector for Fruit 
Heights City, Utah. 
3. During the latter part of 1990 and the early part of 1991, as part of my duties as a 
Building Inspector for Fruit Heights City, I did make various inspections on the home of Chad and 
Ann Edgington located at 25 South Country Lane in Fruit Heights, Utah. 
4. During one of my earlier inspections of the Edgington home on December 18,1990, 
I did make a visit to the Edgington home where I did notice that the rough heating and the framing 
and ventilation was not finished on that date, A copy of the Inspection Card which I used to make 
notations regarding the inspection which I made on December 18,1990 is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
5. I recognize the handwriting on the Inspection Card as my own. The Inspection Card 
was used during the normal course of my duties as a Building Inspector when I inspected residential 
construction. As a standard practice, I would fill out the card and make notations at the site and on 
the day of the inspection. The entries for Framing and Ventilation and Rough Heating were made 
on the dates reflected on the Inspection Card, December 18, 1990. The initials on the entry for 
Framing and Ventilation, "N.C.", stand for "not complete." 
6. I know that the pellet stove and duct work on the Edgington home was not complete 
on December 18,1990. 
-2-
7 If the flaming and ventilation or the rough heating would have been near completed. 
I would have checked oft these items as approved with the anticipation that they would be completed 
in their cntireu b> my next inspection visit which would have been two to four weeks thereafter. 
8. For the pellet stove and pellet stove duct work to have been complete, it would have 
been necessary foi the framing and ventilation and the rough heating to have been substantially 
complete and thus noted on the Inspection Card, which they are not. 
9. At the state of construction of the Hdgingion home on December 18. l()c)0. there 
would have been inadequate time in order to have the subcontractors substantialh complete the 
rough fiaming and lough heating and air and the pellet stove and pellet stove ductwork within two 
days of December 18, 1W0 
Dallas C Vfonsen (Affiant), being first duly sworn and under oath, deposes and says that 
Affiant is not a part> m the above-entitled action: that Affiant has read the foregoing Affidavit, and 
undeistands the contents thereoL and the same is true of Affiant's own knowledge, information and 
belief 
Dallas C, Monscn 
Sl'BSC RJBLD AND SWORN TO before me this O p day of Fehiuary. 2007 
NOTARY PUBLIC O 
:SG1546CS5S 
"il 3M 
THIS tS A JOB RECORD ONLY - NOT A PERMIT 
SFECT3QM C A R D 
RESS 
/ 
NOTICE 
This cnrd shall be r-nniruoirutd Ir- i v c p f ^ c u D D ) t i - i n c f l . o n ' 
the job. p lease cnW ior a!! insp&ntl6nr. . . fn8pGctions'wi l l -be 
rnndf* the fo l lowing day. 
NOTICE 
Approved Bui ldinr j planv are rcquirod on job alia at t ime 
of aach one every i'n&pnctlDn, 
ALSO NOTE 
No work of eny k i nd , on any oort of any bu i l d ing or 
structure requir ing inuqocnion Khali he covorad o^ conooaleri 
in any manner wnatnoever, w i thou t firnt ob ta in ing the 
f i^provni D ( the Bui ld ing Of f ic ia l in w r i t i ng . 
DATE APPROVED REMAHKB 
Setback 
Znniri 5.8 
Fo o\\t}$l 
Founrliinon HninforcinB Stoui 
EIAHZEZZ3^Z L^r 
l J ^ - 4 - V i /A& 
Exemption and Fflrmt 
^L^S^: 
j ^ ~ *3~y ?^U4> ^ ^fed^L$*?£ 
H 
Ground Purntainj) 5£ X /i>4 . s"s 
Undurslflb Duett 
LJnrtn. i^Hb CnnrJLn' 
Pirwnlocn Foundation 
Jain Hnd Glrdarc 
Eincfricai Ground 
Tnmpornry Power ^ : j 
Miri-Hn»qru 5ond_ Bfl 
8 Fool Rand B«»m 
F!n«i Hand Bnorr. 
FimpiHct- Bond B*?Arr. 
Roof Sh««tr,ing 
Fronwno unr VKntilotJfln n~tf,-% 
Roo^ Covering 
•fOOfrlMAee-QUAUTY 
3ITMEIIEMIISSIES: 
trlectricni Service and Ground f/X - /£-&6\JA^J^J&'?>?~^'-
Rough EiecuicHl i '. I « " 
RrjuiJh Piumhtng j / l i<gL ig^ ^ / ^ - 6ffi**f*' ifii$Z&^ ' 
Shown r Pan Text / / - ; ^ - f / r [ 
STUCC3 Mfi.th or EstL»rioi Siding 
S^wfif 
Septic Tnnfc 
Leach L»ne or S/mp Pir 
Back Flow and Crcrj; Connor.ticr. 
/Vater Service 
LBlh-or DrywnlS NoiHng 
j at Line Air Tfltt 
~in.il tlDCinini jL l i i l^Z. 
-ir.al Piurnbinp ' 
'ins! Heannr; -A.C.. 
JMMJJLL 
:
»na! Construcllon T / 
j f e 
2&Z. 
^ ^ ! 
^S. 
% > 
<^2_ -r>—Ji 7 - 1 / -
/> 
^r^y^-
} NOT CONCEAL UNTIL ABOVE ARE SIGNED AND DATED 
)TE i f w o r k i* not morkr td a p p r o v e d , m n k * corrncn)on* no ;od 
undftr romnrkft and cnll fo r a n o t h e r inrcpncrHon hf l foru 
con t lnu lnn w o r k . Parml t «<p)rwn by l i m i t a t i o n 12D day 9 f r o m 
cUtti of permi t If c o n i t r u c t l o n U not «t«rt*»d. Buiiaiinc )r»CDG~ior 
- / 1 . 
/-j 
